Criminal Procedure -- Free Transcripts for Indigents by McGoogan, E. Graham, Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 51 | Number 3 Article 15
2-1-1973
Criminal Procedure -- Free Transcripts for
Indigents
E. Graham McGoogan Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
E. G. McGoogan Jr., Criminal Procedure -- Free Transcripts for Indigents, 51 N.C. L. Rev. 621 (1973).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol51/iss3/15
TRANSCRIPTS FOR INDIGENTS
investigation on a showing of less than probable cause approaches the
outer limit of a permissible governmental intrusion.
KENNETH R. KELLER
Criminal Procedure-Free Transcripts for Indigents
In Britt v. North Carolina' the United States Supreme Court, for
only the second time2 since the Griffin v. Illinois3 decision in 1956,
refused to grant an indigent state defendant a free transcript of a prior
proceeding. Following the landmark Griffin case, which held that an
indigent petitioner was entitled to a trdnscript of his trial for use on
direct appeal, the Court had consistently expanded the right of indigents
to free records to include use of a transcript in habeas corpus proceed-
ings,4 appeal of habeas corpus proceedings, 5 and de novo habeas corpus
hearings.' The procedural relationship in Britt was entirely different
from any of the prior transcript cases the Court had heard, for it was a
request for a record of a mistrial for use during the second trial. The
distinctions in the procedures involved could have served as a basis for
the denial of the transcript, but the Court did not rest its decision on
the basis of the difference in procedural posture. Instead the Britt fact
pattern seems to have been forced into the Griffin line of cases in order
to make clear a new policy of more limited application of Griffin in the
future.
Britt had been indicted for first degree murder, and his first trial
had ended in a hung jury. Before the start of the second trial the defen-
dant's attorney had requested a free transcript of the mistrial, but no
particular reason for the request was given other than the defendant's
indigency. The trial court denied the motion, and in a second trial in
the same town Britt was convicted. The North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the conviction, finding no error in the refusal to grant
192 S. Ct. 431 (1971).
'The only other decision which upheld the denial of a transcript was Norvell v. Illinois, 373
U.S. 420 (1963), where the court reporter for the defendant's trial had died and no one could read
his shorthand notes.
3351 U.S. 12 (1956).
4Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 (1970).
'Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (per curiam).
'Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969).
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the transcript. 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to review
the conviction,' but the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari.9
The Court stated that Griffin has established the principle that "the
State must provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of prior
proceedings when that transcript is needed for an effective defense or
appeal," 0 and concluded that this principle applied to Britt." However,
the denial of Britt's request was no violation of the Griffin doctrine since
[t]he trial of this case took place in a small town where, according to
petitioner's counsel, the court reporter was a good friend of all the
local lawyers and was reporting the second trial. It appears that the
reporter would at any time have read back to counsel his notes of the
mistrial, well in advance of the second trial, if counsel had simply made
an informal request."2
Decided on the same day as Britt was another free transcript case,
Mayer v. City of Chicago.3 The defendant in Mayer was convicted on
nonfelony charges of disorderly conduct and interfering with a police-
man and was fined five hundred dollars. His request for a transcript for
appeal was denied because Illinois provided records only for review of
felony convictions. The Supreme Court held that felony-nonfelony dis-
tinctions were "unreasoned" and impermissible, 4 but instead of order-
ing a transcript for him it remanded the case to the Illinois Supreme
Court to see if alternatives to a full record were available. Mayer is
consistent with Britt in that the disposition was based on the availability
of alternatives, but since the procedural relationship in Mayer was very
close to that in Griffin and since no specific alternative was found in
Mayer, the significant shift in policy by the Court is much less apparent
in Mayer than in Britt.
To understand fully the implications of Britt, it is necessary to look
'State v. Britt, 8 N.C. App. 262, 174 S.E.2d 69 (1970). The court of appeals based its decision
on the fact that the appellant made no showing of any specific errors and they felt that a denial of
this transcript was not a "deprivation of a basic essential of the defendant's defense." Id. at 265,
174 S.E.2d at 71. The United States Supreme Court opinion pointed out that a lack of particular-
ized need is no longer a valid reason for refusing the transcript. 92 S. Ct. at 434,
8277 N.C. 114 (1970) (mem.).
9401 U.S. 973 (1971).
"192 S. Ct. at 433.
"Id.
"Id. at 434-35.




briefly at Griffin and its progeny. In Illinois prior to Griffin, appellate
review was unobtainable without a stenographic transcript of the trial,
a fact conceded by the attorneys for the state in Griffin."5 The Court
ruled that the denial to an indigent of access to the appellate process
because of inability to purchase a transcript, was a violation of due
process since "[p]lainly the ability to pay costs in advance . . could
not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial."1 Moreo-
ver, the refusal to grant the defendant a free record violated equal
protection: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must
be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money
enough to buy transcripts." 7 The Court qualified its holding with an
important caveat: "We do not hold, however, that Illinois must pur-
chase a stenographer's transcript in every case where a defendant cannot
buy it. The Supreme Court may find other means of affording adequate
and effective appellate review to indigent defendants. For example...
bystanders' bills of exceptions . . . could be used in some cases."'"
The important consideration to the Court in Griffin was that Illi-
nois, by requiring presentation of a trial transcript to the appellate court
as a prerequisite to review, was in effect denying indigents access to the
appellate process entirely. The Court stated that a state was not consti-
tutionally required to provide any appeal procedures, but where it does9
the procedure could not be administered so as to discriminate against
the poor.2" The Court stressed the importance to a convicted defendant
of this state right to appeal by noting the number of reversals resulting
from the procedure.' The Court felt that a document potentially so
valuable to the defendant must be open to all convicts even if additional
state expenditures for transcripts and appellate tribunals are required.
Following Griffin was Eskridge v. Washington Stare Board of
Prison Terms and Paroles22 in which the Court reviewed the 'Washington
appellate process, which required a trial transcript to be submitted as a
precondition for review but which denied a free transcript to an indigent




"Every state now does provide some means of appellate review. Id. at 18.
2Id.
21Id. at 18-19.
-357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam).
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unless the trial judge determined that "justice would be promoted"23
by furnishing it. They labeled free access to appellate review without
financial discriminations a constitutional right guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment which Washington, like Illinois in Griffin, had de-
nied the appellant. 4
The Court made a major extension of the free transcript doctrine
in Draper v. Washington 5 by holding that the Constitution requires the
state to furnish an indigent a transcript of his trial for use on appeal
even though appeal is available without it. The Court held that for a
state indigent to get the adequate appeal to which he is entitled the State
must furnish him a "'record of sufficient completeness' for adequate
consideration of the errors assigned." 2
In Long v. District Court" the Court held that an indigent convict
also has a right to sue for his liberty on equal terms with defendants
able to purchase transcripts and that a state infringed upon this right
when it refused to grant the request for a transcript of a habeas corpus
hearing for use in appealing that post-conviction proceeding. As in
Draper, the appellant would not have been denied access to the court
without the transcript; the court simply could not have afforded him as
complete a review without it.
The right to a transcript of a prior proceeding has been extended
to other procedural areas in recent years. In Roberts v. LaVallee,2" it
was held a constitutional violation to deny a defendant a record of a
preliminary hearing for use in preparing for his trial. A similar trans-
gression was cited in Gardner v. California,29 where a request for a copy
of the minutes of a habeas corpus hearing for use at a de novo post-
conviction proceeding was refused. Williams v. Oklahoma City"0 held
that the right to a transcript for a direct appeal included appeals for
petty offenses. In the last transcript case prior to Britt, Wade v.
Wilson,31 the Court implied that a trial transcript must be provided for
use in preparing a habeas corpus petition, although it reserved decision
on the question pending further lower court inquiries.
21d. at 215.
"ld. at 216.
-5372 U.S. 487 (1963).
251d. at 497.
-385 U.S. 192 (1966) (per curiam).
-389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam).
*393 U.S. 367 (1969).
-'395 U.S. 458 (1969) (per curiam).
31396 U.S. 282 (1970).
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While the fact patterns for all the transcript cases prior to Britt
differed, all possessed a common element: without the transcript the
petitioners in each case would effectively be denied a full and complete
judicial proceeding. On direct appeal from trial, for example, which was
the procedure involved in Griffin, Eskridge, and Draper, the appellant
is at a serious disadvantage, for he must overcome a presumption held
by the appellate court that his trial was free of prejudicial error. The
defendant certainly will desire and need a closer examination of the
details of the first proceeding when the presumption at the second pro-
ceeding operates to his disadvantage, rather than when the state carries
the burden of proof. In trying to raise and prove possible mistakes
without a record, he faces an almost hopeless task. No one's memory
is good enough to remember all that happened at a trial, especially when
much of the proceeding is beyond the understanding of laymen.
The petitioner for a trial transcript for use in a habeas corpus
proceeding faces a similar presumption that his imprisonment is just.
To free himself he must prove specific trial errors. More time has
usually elapsed between the trial and the post-conviction relief hearing
than between the trial and the direct appeal, so there is an even greater
likelihood that the petitioners will not be able without a record to re-
member and to present specific trial mistakes to the reviewing body.
The only two cases the Supreme Court has decided that did not
involve use of a transcript at a second proceeding that was a direct
review of a first proceeding were Roberts v. LaVallee,3 2 the preliminary
hearing case, and Gardner v. California,33 the de novo post-conviction
relief hearing. These two cases are the only ones that exhibit any paral-
lels to the Britt procedural pattern, for the second trial in Britt was not
a review of the first trial. A close look at the similarities between Britt
and these two prior cases, however, reveals that the conduct and deci-
sions of the first proceeding in both Roberts and Gardner were very
importarnt to the subsequent one, which is not the case in Britt. A
preliminary hearing is not a criminal prosecution but simply an inquiry
to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
a prima facie case against the accused. 4 No punishment is inflicted on
the defendant as a result of the findings of the hearing. It is not, how-
32389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam).
-393 U.S. 367 (1969).3 People v. Smith, 45 Misc. 2d 265, 256 N.Y.S.2d 422 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1965); People
v. Ehrlich, 14 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Magis. Ct. 1939).
1973]
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ever, a neutral proceeding which does not affect the nature of the trial,
for the very purpose of the inquest is to acquaint the accused with the
charges and evidence against him and to examine the weight and credi-
bility of that evidence. Rulings concerning these matters are binding at
trial. The need for a transcript of a preliminary hearing then, is roughly
equivalent to the need for a trial transcript on appeal, especially where
the defendant plans to object to rulings of the hearing judge.
In Gardner the indigent, having lost his first habeas corpus hearing,
filed a similar petition in a higher state court for a proceeding de
novo.35 The Court treated the second hearing as an appeal process,
however, stating that the "petitioner carries the burden of convincing
the appellate court that the hearing before the lower court was either
inadequate or that the legal conclusions . . . were erroneous."3 Again
the defendant in this situation is faced with trying to upset a prior
proceeding at a second proceeding, and it is highly improbable that he
can do so without the aid of some type of record. If it were a true de
novo hearing where the results of the first hearing would be irrelevant
at the second hearing, then it is unlikely the Court would find the need
for a transcript of the first proceeding. It is doubtful, however, if there
ever could be a second habeas corpus review which totally ignored the
first review.
The procedural relationship involved in Britt is quite different from
any of the prior cases, because a second trial following a mistrial is a
new trial entirely. The defendant is still entitled to the presumption of
innocence, and nothing that happened at the first trial is binding on the
subsequent proceeding. He is placed in no poorer position as a result of
the mistrial and, in fact, may be in a much better position since most
of the prosecution's case will have been revealed to him. Of course, the
entire defense of the accused may have been revealed to the state also,
but the advantage to the defendant is nonetheless greater. The prosecu-
tion still has to carry the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
As a result, often the prosecution will enter a nolle prosequi after a
mistrial. At any rate, all of the transcript cases prior to Britt involved
consideration by subsequent tribunals of questions raised in or by an
earlier proceeding. In Britt the two trials were independent. For this
reason, the defendant's interest in obtaining a transcript of his mistrial
is so minimal that the federal courts would almost certainly uphold a




state law or ruling that refused to provide such a transcript even if the
defendant were able to pay for it. Although Griffin noted that there is
no absolute due process right to an appeal,3 it is questionable, despite
this dictum in Griffin, whether the Court would countenance the com-
plete and uniform denial of appellate review of a state's criminal pro-
ceedings, which undeniably would be the effect of a refusal to provide a
transcript to a defendant for his use on appeal, even if the defendant
were willing to pay for it.
Instead of deciding Britt on the basis of these procedural distinc-
tions and basing the refusal to grant the transcript on the grounds that
no interest of the defendant had been violated, the Court discussed the
case entirely in terms of Griffin and premised the denial on the availabil-
ity of the adequate alternative. Despite the marked dissimilarity be-
tween Britt's request and those of the indigents in prior Supreme Court
cases, the Court seems to have chosen the case to reveal a new policy
in the transcript area. Without overruling Griffin, the Court38 appar-
ently wanted to retard what it deemed to be the somewhat excessively
liberal trend the Court had been following in granting records to almost
anyone who asked, a burden that has become fairly material to the
states.39 The vehicle it used to impose the limitation was the concept
of an alternative. Implicit in the finding of an adequate alternative is a
recognition of the procedural differences.
It is doubtful that the Court was altogether unconscious of the fact
that Britt's need for the document he requested was less demonstrable
than that of prior defendants whose requests had been granted. Never-
theless, it is only by inference that one can interpret the decision as
saying that the alternative is adequate because of the limited nature of
the interest injured by refusing a transcript. Nowhere does the Court
express any relation between the doubtful utility of a transcript to Britt
and the adequacy of the alternative. Rather, the Court seems content
to permit a more disturbing inference: that the alternative is found
adequate because of its essential virtues. In other words, it is possible
to interpret the case as authority for the proposition that where
similar circumstances prevail-where the community is small and
"351 U.S. at 18.
'Britt was a five-to-two decision, Justices Powell and Rehnquist had not taken the oath at
the time of the decision. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion, with Justices Douglas and Brennan
dissenting.
"'In North Carolina it is already approximately $75,000 annually. Brief for Respondent at 8,
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
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there is sufficient familiarity between defense counsel and the court
reporter-the alternative would do service for any transcript, in-
cluding a transcript to be used to prepare a case for direct appeal.
This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the decision was
rendered in company with Mayer, which was remanded with instruc-
tions to determine whether there was an alternative.
After Griffin had established the principle that a state did not have
to buy a transcript in every case if the courts could find equivalent
alternatives," Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles41 and Draper v. Washington 2 reiterated the idea and enumer-
ated a few more possible substitutes-a statement of facts agreed on by
both sides or a full narrative statement prepared from the judge's min-
utes.43 The court in Long possibly diminished the alternative principle
by saying "[w]e need not consider a possible situation where a transcript
cannot reasonably be made available . . . by the State."4 4 Since Long
was a per curiam opinion, arguably this statement should not be given
as much credence and should be confined to the facts of the case. How-
ever, the policy of ignoring the possibility of an alternative was contin-
ued in Roberts v. LaVallee,45 the preliminary hearing case, which did
not even mention that possibility. The dissenting opinion revealed that
the transcript of the grand jury proceeding was available, but the major-
ity did not even note that fact. In Gardner v. California" no alternatives
were suggested by the Court other than the memories of the defendant
and his lawyer, and they were held insufficient. One of the most recent
cases, Wade v. Wilson,47 similarly mentioned no alternatives to a tran-
script.
Britt and Mayer then seem to be major reversals of the trend the
Court had been following. These two cases not only gave lip service to
the idea of alternatives, but actually applied the doctrine. Even in the
pre-Long decisions which had suggested alternatives," none were ever
found acceptable. It is not possible to distinguish the finding of the
4351 U.S. at 16.
41357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam).
42372 U.S. 487 (1963).
11372 U.S. at 495; 357 U.S. at 215.
11385 U.S. at 195.
-389 U.S. 40 (1967).
45393 U.S. 367 (1969).
47396 U.S. 282 (1970).
"Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Eskridge v. State Bd. of Prison Terms and
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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alternative in Britt from the failure to find one in Long, Gardner, and
Wade on the basis that the attorneys in Britt pushed the concept: no
substitute was mentioned in either of the briefs submitted in the Britt
case.
4 9
The very tenuous nature of the alternative actually found enforces
the idea that the Court was using Britt to reveal a new policy. Two
federal courts of appeals had held that allowing the court reporter to
read to the defense counsel during the second trial any pertinent por-
tions of the minutes of the first trial was a sufficient alternative to a full
transcript. The courts, however, began to realize that the transcript
was valuable not only for impeachment, but also as a discovery instru-
ment. Consequently, the Second Circuit, in United States ex reL Wilson
v. McMann,51 rejected as an adequate alternative the reference to the
minutes of mistrial during the second trial, calling it "too little, too
late.""2 The court in Britt distinguished its holding from Wilson by
stating that the defense attorney could have asked the court reporter to
read the minutes prior to the trial, not during. 3 After Britt, courts may
be more likely to find adequate alternatives in all transcript cases, in-
cluding those in which the documents are requested in anticipation of
direct appeals and habeas corpus petitions. If the adequacy of the substi-
tute in Britt was a result of the procedural relationship involved, the
Court was certainly not at pains to say so. For this reason the cases may
presage a significant change in policy by the Court.
The nature of the decision in Britt has left open some questions.
The practical availability of this alternative is very questionable. Court
reporters' offices, especially in small towns where the opinion implies
that this alternative will be most relevant, do not have the staff to record
every case and read minutes of prior trials to any attorneys who "infor-
mally ask." Problems will arise as to how large the district must be
before it is no longer a valid substitute or how close the relationships
between the reporter and lawyer must be to qualify. Certainly discrimi-
nations between the reporter's friends and those whom he does not know
raise equal protection questions. How these questions will be answered
"Brief for Petitioner, Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (197 1); Brief for Respondent, Britt
v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
"'Forsberg v. United States, 351 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966);
Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 905 (1964).
51408 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1969).
'lid. at 897.
u92 S. Ct. at 434-35.
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and what the full impact of Britt and Mayer will be, of course, are still
only matters of speculation. Analysis of the decisions does indicate,
however, that indigent defendants are likely to face more opposition
than they have faced in the past to their requests for transcripts for
whatever purpose the transcripts are desired.
E. GRAHAM McGOOGAN, JR.
Criminal Procedure-Restricting Right to Counsel at Lineups
In Kirby v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court confronted
the problem of whether identification evidence is admissible when the
accused was exhibited to identifying witnesses in the absence of counsel
before he had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with a crimi-
nal offense. A sharply divided Court2 refused to extend the sixth amend-
ment guarantee of counsel3 to preindictment identification confronta-
tions. Thus Kirby considerably restricts the role of counsel in protection
of the pretrial rights of the accused.
A brief examination of the history of the right to counsel clause is
helpful in analyzing Kirby. Beginning with Powell v. Alabama,4 the
Supreme Court construed the sixth amendment guarantee to apply to
"critical stages" of proceedings against an accused.' In Powell, the
Court recognizes that the period from arraignment to trial was "perhaps
the most critical period of the proceedings." 6 Furthermore,in Hamilton
192 S. Ct. 1877 (1972).
2Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, an-
nounced the judgment of the Court. Id. at 1879. Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring statement
on the basis that right to counsel attaches as soon as the accused is formally indicted. Id. at 1883,
Justice Powell filed a statement concurring in the result as he would not extend the Wade-Gilbert
per se exclusionary rule. Id. Justice White dissented on the basis that United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), compelled a reversal. Id. at 1980.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Douglas also dissented on the basis of Wade and
Gilbert. Id. at 1883.
3U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The guarantee states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
4287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
I[T]oday's law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the ac-
cused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the
accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these
realities of modern criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment
guarantee to apply to "critical" stages of the proceedings.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
1287 U.S. at 57.
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